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Abstract 
In January 2002, President George W Bush signed into law what is arguably the most 
important piece of US educational legislation for the past 35 years. For the first time, 
Public Law 107-110 links high stakes testing with strict accountability measures designed 
to ensure that, at least in schools that receive government funding, no child is left behind. 
The appropriately named No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) links government funding to 
strict improvement policies for America’s public schools. Much of what is undertaken in 
NCLB is praiseworthy, the Act is essentially equitable for it ensures that schools pay due 
regard to the progress of those sections of the school population who have traditionally 
done less well in school, in particular, students from economically disadvantaged homes, 
as well as those from ethnic minority backgrounds and those who have limited 
proficiency to speak English. However, this seemingly salutatory aspect of the Act is also 
the one that has raised the most objections. This paper describes the key features of this 
important piece of legislation before outlining why it is that a seemingly equitable Act 
has produced so much consternation in US education circles. Through an exploration of 
school level data for the state of New Jersey, the paper considers the extent to which 
these concerns have been justified during the early days of No Child Left Behind. 
 
What is No Child Left Behind? 
 
‘There have been two basic policy eras in US education policy since mid-century: a 
struggle for access and equity that dominated the period from 1960 to 1980 and a 
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focus on competition and standards that prevailed in the 1980s and 1990s’ (Orfield 
2000, p406). 
 
This re-focusing of US education policy was perhaps no better demonstrated than when 
the No Child Left Behind legislation was passed into law by President George W Bush 
early in 2002. For a seemingly equitable Act, which endeavours to ensure the academic 
progress of all students, the levels of criticism that have met its inception have been 
surprising. Despite this apparently equitable intent, some commentators fear that the high 
stakes testing and accountability-linked sanctions that underpin the Act could result in 
many otherwise successful schools being labelled as failing. Through an examination of 
how strict accountability measures became so entwined with government policy to raise 
standards in American public schools and an exploration of school level data for the state 
of New Jersey, this paper considers the extent to which these concerns have been justified 
during the early days of No Child Left Behind. 
 
No Child Left Behind requires that all schools and school districts which receive Title-1 
federal funding put into place a set of standards for improving student achievement, 
together with detailed plans charting how these standards with be monitored and met. 
Title-1 is a part of the Elementary and Secondary Schools Act which distributes federal 
funds to disadvantaged areas, about 90% of America’s 15,000 school districts receive 
Title-1 funding (Ravitch 1995). A major consequence of these standards is that schools 
will be required to set targets and monitor the progress of students, and subgroups of 
students, in order to ensure that 100% of all students reach certain minimum proficiency 
levels by 2014. Failure to achieve proficiency would lead to ‘corrective action’, which, in 
its most extreme manifestation would result in school closure (Department of Education 
2002). Unlike the UK, the US has a very de-centralised system of education, with much 
of the control over schools devolved to school districts which act on behalf of the state. 
There is no national assessment system nor a national curriculum, the responsibility for 
ascertaining standards, assessment tools and curriculum coverage lies with the individual 
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states. However, just like in the UK, a ‘crisis account’ exists over the apparent 
underachievement of American schools, particularly with regard to their relative 
performance in international comparative tests (Schmidt et al 1999). Legislation like No 
Child Left Behind is designed, through complex systems of school accountability and 
sanctions, to remedy this. 
 
The concept of accountability coupled with high stakes testing is not new in US 
educational policy; indeed NCLB is a composite of earlier legislation, including state-
wide accountability protocols and testing regimes. During the 1990s, the majority of 
states introduced an element of state-wide testing and, to a lesser extent, accountability 
measures, and by 2002 most had some form of testing procedure in place (Rudalevige 
2003). However, what is new, is the scope and potential impact of the NCLB sanctions, 
and many commentators fear that the undertaking to ensure that every child reaches full 
proficiency may result in large numbers of otherwise successful schools being labelled as 
failing (Kane and Staiger 2003, Popham 2004). 
 
By January 2003, each state was required to submit to the US Department of Education a 
detailed workbook outlining the steps they would undertake to ensure compliance with 
the statutes set out under NCLB. The Act itself requires that by 2005, states assess 
performance annually in grades 3 to 81 in Language Arts Literacy and Mathematics, and 
in Science by 2007. Additional tests must also be administered to students during grades 
10 to 122
                                                 
1 National Curriculum years 4 to 9 
. States must also indicate how both schools and school districts will 
demonstrate Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) towards full proficiency by 2014 and make 
public their test results. This performance data will also be disaggregated according to 
different student sub-groups, characterised by students’ sex, minority group, Special 
Educational Need, level of economic disadvantage and English language proficiency. 
Typically, a subgroup would comprise 25 students, although states do vary in their 
2 National Curriculum years 11 to 13 
 
'This is an electronic version of an article published in The Journal of Education Policy 
Vol. 20, No. 4 (July 2005): 507-524. The Journal of Education Policy is available online 
at: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/02680939.asp.  
 
4
definition of this (Department of Education 2002, New Jersey Department of Education 
2004). In addition to annual testing, schools must also ensure that at least 95% of all 
students are assessed. If this target is not met, then schools will not make AYP, regardless 
of the proficiency scores of the remainder of the cohort (Popham 2004). If a school fails 
to make AYP, a series of sanctions can be administered by the school district. The form 
of these sanctions ranges from district level monitoring through to giving parents the 
option to transfer their children out of 'failing’ schools and providing students who 
remain in the school with additional tutoring. In more extreme cases, where a school fails 
to make AYP for four or more consecutive years, that school can be faced with having to 
replace staff, aspects of the curriculum or, at the extreme, be re-structured as a Charter 
school or one run by a private company. 
 
‘Compassionate conservatism’ and the ‘failure’ of public schools: The origins of NCLB 
 
The NCLB Act has risen from a ‘primeval soup’ (Kingdon J., in Rudalevige 2003, p27) 
of education policy to raise standards in America’s public schools that has spanned 
several decades. Although many of the components of the Act contain little that is 
completely new, what is unusual is how the Act managed to achieve widespread 
bipartisan support from Congress. Traditionally the federal government, and Republican 
administrations, in particular, has avoided much direct influence in educational 
initiatives, particularly as federal funds only contribute about 7% of a state’s total 
educational revenue (Hochschild 2003).    In order to appreciate this unprecedented level 
of federal interest in educational achievement in the context of the No Child Left Behind 
Act, it is important to recognise that standards in America’s public schools have long 
been under scrutiny. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 by the USSR had far reaching 
repercussions and created pressure on schools to raise academic standards, as well as 
enrolment on mathematics, science and foreign language courses (Ravitch 1995).  
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Subsequent decades of falling or stagnating scores on two key nationally administered 
tests, namely the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP), coupled with dubious performance on international 
comparative tests, reaching as far back as the First International Maths and Science Study 
(FIMSS) in the 1960s, contributed to the publication in 1983 of a searing indictment of 
educational standards when the Regan administration released A Nation at Risk. The 
invective used in this document is strong and condemns the ‘rising tide of mediocrity’ 
(NCEE 1983) which was eroding the American public school system: 
 
‘If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America   
the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have 
viewed it as an act of war’ (NCEE 1983, p3) 
 
While the emphasis on raising standards can be traced back to at least the 1980s, federal 
interest in public school accountability, coupled with high stakes testing and elements of 
school choice has been evident in education policy reforms ever since. Consequently, the 
No Child Left Behind Act ‘collected and encompassed proposals advanced in theory and 
substance for years, accrediting Ronald Regan-, George H W Bush- and Bill Clinton-era 
initiatives into a single bill’ (Rudalevige 2003, p24).  
 
Having established the key developments surrounding the inception and content of this 
new piece of legislation, the following section will consider how some of the 
accountability measures demanded under No Child Left Behind are working in practice 
during the early days of the Act.  
 
Making Adequate Yearly Progress: concerns over rules for student subgroups 
 
On the one hand raising the achievement of students in all America’s public schools 
would appear to be both equitable and praiseworthy. However, some of the implications 
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of NCLB’s strict accountability rules and sanctions, in particular those that apply to 
student subgroups, could result in great numbers of schools and their students being 
labelled as failing. One of the strengths of the Act is that, as its very title suggests, it 
demands that the academic progress of every child, regardless how able, be open to 
scrutiny. However, the reason that many commentators and practitioners take issue with 
this, is that the Act also states very clearly that not only is every child expected to make 
progress, they must make sufficient progress to achieve minimum competency levels 
within 12 years of the Act’s inception. According to Linn, one of the flaws with the 100% 
proficiency target is in its expectation that all schools must achieve the 100% levels, even 
though the number of schools who are actually at those levels today is very small. In 
other words, he argues that ‘we should not set a goal for all schools that is so high that no 
school has yet achieved it’ (2003, p4). 
 
As NCLB does not mandate specific annual progress targets towards full proficiency, 
every state is required to chart their own timeline for making Adequate Yearly Progress, 
so that by 2014 each student, and student subgroup, achieves at or above the state’s 
proficiency levels. The Act, however, does specify that students must make annual 
incremental progress towards full proficiency. The temptation, of course, is that states 
will set their AYP targets very low, focusing for example on basic skills tests (Hess 2003, 
McNeill 2000, Haney 2000). According to Popham (2004), such incremental progress 
would mean that many schools would have to raise the number of ‘at proficiency’ 
students by 5 or 6 percentage points annually. For these schools, sustaining such year on 
year increases could result in many of them failing to meet AYP targets within a few 
years. Indeed, according to Lee, the progress rates of many schools would have to 
increase by 6 or 7 times if proficiency targets are to be reached by the 2014 deadline (Lee 
2004). In their efforts to minimize the chances of costly ‘AYP-induced failure’, some 
states have crafted what Popham calls ‘inventive’ timelines. Figure 1 below shows the 
timeline for achieving full proficiency in state tests in Grade 8 mathematics in New 
Jersey. 
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Figure 1: New Jersey’s incremental timeline for AYP in Grade 8 mathematics  
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‘Inventive’ timelines such as these are designed to reduce the likelihood of schools failing 
to make AYP during the early years of the Act. For example, in New Jersey in 2005, 49% 
of students are expected to meet proficiency levels in Grade 8 mathematics. Schools, in 
order to make AYP, would first have to achieve and then maintain these levels for the 
next two years before making a relatively large 13 percentage point jump in 2008, when 
62% of students would have to be proficient. This means that between 2003 and 2007, 
school proficiency levels, on this scale will only have to increase by 10 percentage points, 
rather than the 20 percentage points required on a linear scale.  
 
It also means that only about half of the school’s students have to be proficient by the end 
of 2007, leaving the remaining 50%, presumably students of lower ability, or those with 
Limited English Proficiency, to achieve these levels in the remaining 7 years of the Act. 
Additionally, in 7 of the timeline’s 12 years, no annual progress at all is required. The 
justification for leaving larger jumps in the numbers of students achieving proficiency 
levels until later on in the Act’s lifetime would seem sensible. It is a new and untried 
'This is an electronic version of an article published in The Journal of Education Policy 
Vol. 20, No. 4 (July 2005): 507-524. The Journal of Education Policy is available online 
at: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/02680939.asp.  
 
8
piece of legislation and the penalties for not achieving AYP are potentially stringent, it is 
therefore very likely that reform to the Act will take place, perhaps in the form of 
softening accountability sanctions (Hess 2003). One need only read an edition of 
Education Week (the US equivalent of the Times Education Supplement) to see that 
amendments to NCLB legislation are likely. It should also be noted that New Jersey is by 
no means alone in setting timelines like this; Ohio, for example, has a similar system 
(Linn 2003). 
 
However, even at the start of the 12-year timeline towards full proficiency, the numbers 
of schools failing to make AYP are large. In Washington State, in 2003, 436 out of 2000 
schools failed to make AYP (Bylsma 2004), predictions for California for the 2004-05 
school year indicate that almost two-thirds of the state’s schools will not make AYP 
(Perry 2004), and in Missouri half of the state’s 2000 public schools failed to make AYP 
in 2003 (Education Week 2004b).  
 
Another important feature of these AYP timelines is how they compare with the states’ 
own accountability measures. Several states already have their own accountability 
targets, many of which have been in place for some time. In fact 21 states are maintaining 
their own accountability systems in parallel to NCLB (Education Week 2004a). However, 
the two systems do not necessarily concur, in fact, in just about every state a higher 
proportion of schools met state AYP targets but not targets for NCLB. For example, in 
California, 78% of schools met the state accountability requirements, compared to only 
55% for NCLB, and in North Carolina, 90% of schools met the state requirements and 
only 47% made AYP under No Child Left Behind (Education Week 2004a). This presents 
a dilemma, not only for parents whose children’s schools, on one accountability measure 
are successful and on the other, are labelled as ‘failing’ and subject to corrective 
sanctions. It certainly begs the question of whose accountability system most accurately 
reflects progress and achievement in schools. It would seen bizarre, but certainly not 
unlikely to foresee a scenario where a school that has failed to make AYP under No Child 
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Left Behind for two consecutive years is having to offer students the choice of attending 
another local school, while on the state’s accountability measures, that school is a 
success. 
 
One of reasons why many schools which would otherwise be successful on state 
accountability measures, might be deemed to be failing under NCLB, is due to the Act’s 
strict rules for student subgroups. While few would disagree that challenging the progress 
of groups of students who have traditionally done less well in school is praiseworthy; the 
issue lies with the expectation that these students must also meet the demanding AYP 
proficiency targets otherwise their schools will receive stiff penalties. According to Kane 
and Staiger, the use of subgroup rules is ‘counter productive in test-based accountability 
systems’ (2003, p152), while Linn argues that ‘the goals that NCLB sets for student 
achievement would be wonderful if they could be reached, but, unfortunately, they are 
quite unrealistic, so much so, that they are apt to do more to demoralise educators than to 
inspire them’ (Linn 2003, p10).  
 
That 100% of students are required to reach full proficiency levels, when relatively few 
do at present, is to some commentators unworkable, not least because of the way that 
disadvantaged groups of students are unevenly distributed in America’s schools. These 
are concerns that focus mainly, although not exclusively, on the educational experiences 
of children who live in America’s large cities. Although the United States is a wealthy 
country, there exist within it large pockets of poor and isolated groups. With one of the 
most unequal distributions of wealth of any industrialised country, the US has large 
sections of its population living in poverty, mainly in the urban areas of large cities 
(Orfield 2000). The fact that students from different economic and cultural backgrounds 
are not distributed evenly throughout the USA, and indeed are clustered in certain 
localities, has important implications for the NCLB subgroup rules. With many 
commentators suggesting that the sanctions linked to the subgroup proficiency measures 
will result in diverse schools and schools with large numbers of students being unfairly 
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penalized (Abedi 2003, Kane and Staiger 2003, Popham 2004, Lee 2004). In the USA, 
these schools are likely to be those with large proportions of students with Limited 
English Proficiency (LEP), as well as children from certain ethnic minority backgrounds 
and those from poorer homes. 
 
At present in the United States, over 7 million children are enrolled in elementary and 
secondary schools in the nation’s central cities, and almost a third of all children of 
school age (over 15 million children) live in the suburban fringes of these cities 
(Department of Education 2002a, NCES 2002). However, the distribution of children 
within both these communities is uneven.  Only 6% of white children attend schools in 
urban areas, compared with 31% of children from ethnic minority backgrounds (in 
particular African-American and Hispanic children) (Department of Education 2002a). 
Nationally, 16% of children, between the ages of 5 and 17, are identified as living in 
poverty, 24% of these children live in the central cities, while 10% live in their suburbs 
(Department of Education 2002a). In some states like New Mexico and California, over 
80% of schools contain a Hispanic or African-American subgroup, compared to only 5% 
of schools in Virginia. Additionally, 92% of African-American students and 91% of 
Hispanics attend schools with Black or Hispanic subgroups, compared with only 33% of 
white students (Kane and Staiger 2003).  
 
That African-American students perform less well on standardised tests than European 
Americans is well documented in US educational research. Longitudinal assessments 
since the 1960s have shown white students to be ahead in every measure and at every 
grade (Jencks and Phillips 1998). More recently, data from the National Assessment of 
Educational Performance (NAEP) revealed wide disparities between the attainment of 
African-American and white students. Similar trends were also reported between the 
performance of students from white and Hispanic backgrounds. According to the authors 
of the study, ‘the single most important determinant of the difference in failure rates 
between states is likely to be the racial composition of their schools’ (Kane and Staiger 
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2003, p175). In addition, the reason why almost 57% of Ohio’s school districts failed to 
make AYP in 2003 was either partly or fully because of the progress of students with 
SEN (Chester 2004). In Washington state, it was larger schools with more diverse 
populations who were also less likely to achieve yearly accountability targets (Bylsma 
2004). Texas, one state held up as a model of school accountability reforms, has for some 
time monitored proficiency targets for subgroups of students. However, the expected 
targets were different for students at aggregate and disaggregate level: 90% proficiency 
targets overall and 55% proficiency targets for subgroups of students (Kane and Staiger 
2003).  
 
So on the one hand, we have a seemingly equitable piece of legislation, designed to give 
all students equal chances of success in school. However, schooling in America's public 
schools appears to be anything but equitable. The concern is that, in its present form, the 
No Child Left Behind legislation could further enhance these inequities and unfairly label 
children and schools as underachieving. In the final section of this paper, we consider the 
extent to which some of the fears of the opponents of No Child Left Behind have been 
realised during the early days of the legislation. Using the state of New Jersey as a case 
study, we consider how accurately we are able to label schools that do not make AYP as 
underachieving or failing. 
 
No Child Left Behind - New Jersey style 
New Jersey is the most densely populated state in the USA. It has a population of around 
8 million people, only 10% of whom live in the New Jersey’s six largest cities. In 1999-
2001, the median household income in New Jersey was above that for the rest of the 
nation ($52,137, compared with $42,873 nationally), and fewer children and adults were 
identified as living in poverty (NCES 2002). New Jersey has 626 school districts, 120 of 
which are classed as wealthy and 30 districts that are designated as the poorest or ‘special 
needs’ districts. These poorest districts are also known as the ‘Abbott’ districts, so named 
after the plaintiffs who brought about the legal challenges to the distribution of school 
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financing in New Jersey during the 1980s. The New Jersey Department of Education 
categorises school districts in the range A-I based on their relative wealth and 
socioeconomic status. Schools in the A category are overwhelmingly, although not 
exclusively, located in the poorer Abbott districts, while schools in categories I and J are 
located in the wealthiest school districts (New Jersey Department of Education 2004b). 
This categorization of New Jersey’s school districts is important, educational policy in 
New Jersey has been shaped by over 25 years of school finance litigation and by 20 years 
of state efforts to hold school districts financially accountable for the quality of the 
education they provide. In June 1990, the state supreme court declared that New Jersey’s 
school finance law was unconstitutional, that urban schools were not providing their 
students with the ‘through and efficient’ education demanded in New Jersey’s 
constitution and that funding inequities should be eliminated (Firestone et al 1997). In its 
ruling, the New Jersey state supreme court required that more financial resources go to 
poorer urban districts than to wealthier ones. The premise for this was that because of 
their additional social and community responsibilities, schools in the urban districts 
needed more money than those in wealthier areas. Schools in urban New Jersey had 
suffered many decades of under-funding and decline, not just because of changing 
demographics in the central cities, but also because of the way in which education is 
financed in the USA (Anyon 1997). In America, public school funding is available from 
three main sources, the federal government, who typically contribute about 7-8%; the 
state (contributing around 48%) and local taxes (around 45%), although the exact 
proportions do vary by state (Adams and Adams 2003, Flanagan and Gissmer 2004, The 
Education Trust 2002 and table 1 below). States tend to delegate their proportion of the 
funds based on student numbers and student characteristics and under this mechanism 
urban areas do tend to get more funding. However, local financing tends to be closely 
linked to property taxes. Therefore higher property values will raise more money for local 
schools. In urban areas, where property prices tend to be lower than in the suburbs, the 
funds raised for schools by property taxes are proportionally lower than those raised in 
suburban districts. These different funding mechanisms result in many of America’s 
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urban districts being funded inequitably. For example, in New York state, where the 
funding gaps are among the largest, pupils who attend school in districts in the upper 
quartile for poverty can be allocated $2,152 per student less than if they had attended a 
school in a district in the lower quartile for poverty. These $2,152 equate to a difference 
of $53,800 for a class of 25 students, or $860,800 for a school of 400 students. Similar 
gaps in state and local funding appear between districts with the highest and lowest 
proportions of students from ethnic minority backgrounds; a gap which nationally 
corresponds to $902 per pupil, or $22,550 for a class of 25 students and $360,800 for a 
school of 400 (The Education Trust 2002). 
 
In New Jersey, where school funding is among the most equitable in the whole of the 
United States, mainly as a result of judicial intervention over the last two decades, 
students in the poorest school districts do receive a greater proportion of state funding 
and per pupil expenditure than those in the wealthiest districts (table 1). Notice also the 
relatively low proportion of funding that is provided by the federal government, typically 
around 3%. It is this funding stream that is directly linked to the NCLB sanctions. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of school funding according to the relative wealth of school districts 
in New Jersey. 
 
District Number of 
schools 
Mean revenue 
from local 
sources (%) 
Mean revenue 
from state 
sources (%) 
Mean revenue 
from federal 
sources (%) 
Per pupil 
expenditure ($) 
A 398 13 75 5 13227 
B 263 41 49 4 10985 
CD 229 52 39 3 10470 
DE 349 62 30 3 10089 
FG 293 69 24 2 10588 
GH 306 78 17 2 11083 
I 405 85 11 1 10962 
J 35 86 6 1 11646 
Total 2278 57 35 3 11156 
Source: New Jersey Department of Education 2004. 
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New Jersey is an interesting example of a state that has sought to eliminate inequities in 
school funding, while attempting to ensure adequate for provision for students who attend 
schools in the poorest districts. How the NCLB accountability targets impact upon the 
State’s attempts to provide the ‘through and efficient’ education demanded under its 
constitution will be considered below. 
 
State testing and school accountability 
Since 1978, students in New Jersey have been assessed in grades 3, 6 and 9 or 11 in 
reading and mathematics. Over the past two decades, the testing regime has been revised 
and updated to include basic skills tests, curriculum content standards, accountability 
measures, public reporting of district level scores and high school graduation tests 
(Firestone et al 1997). When NCLB was implemented in 2002, students in New Jersey 
were being assessed state-wide in Grade 4 (The New Jersey Assessment of Skills and 
Knowledge 4), in Grade 8 (the Grade Eight Proficiency Assessment) and in Grade 12 
(The High School Proficiency Assessment). In 2003, 208 schools, or around 10% of New 
Jersey’s elementary and high schools, were identified as being "in need of improvement" 
for a second year (New Jersey Department of Education 2003). These schools did not 
meet all their Adequate Yearly Progress targets despite the fact that many did reach or 
exceed their targets in one of two content areas. The consequences of failing to make 
Adequate Yearly Progress for two consecutive years mean that parents are now free to 
transfer their children to other schools in the district, while the school will continue to 
receive technical assistance with its curriculum and teaching programmes. 
 
In the following sections we look more closely at the key characteristics of these schools. 
By comparing these ‘failing’ schools with other schools in New Jersey, and by taking into 
account contextual features of these schools, we consider the extent to which the 
sanctions demanded under No Child Left Behind can be justified. 
 
The characteristics of New Jersey’s schools 
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The data used in this analysis was retrieved from the New Jersey School Report Cards 
(New Jersey Department of Education 2003, New Jersey Department of Education 
2004a). These report cards provide contextual and performance data for all of New 
Jersey’s schools and school districts. In this analysis schools were allocated to one of 
three groups: schools that failed to make AYP for two consecutive years, schools in the 
Abbott districts and schools who were neither Abbott schools nor failed to make AYP 
(here designated as ‘other’ schools). Some of the characteristics of these schools were 
compared with those of all New Jersey schools and appear in table 2 below. 
 
'This is an electronic version of an article published in The Journal of Education Policy 
Vol. 20, No. 4 (July 2005): 507-524. The Journal of Education Policy is available online 
at: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/02680939.asp.  
 
16
Table 2: The characteristics of New Jersey’s schools  
 
 Schools not 
making AYP 
Abbott schools Other schools All schools 
N % N % N % N % 
Mean attendance rate 201 93 458 93 1755 95 2250 95 
Mean school size 201 591 458 632 1747 583 2234 592 
Students with LEP 201 8 458 11 1762 3 2257 5 
Students speaking 
English at home 
201 71 458 65 1762 86 2257 82 
Students with 
disabilities 
201 12 458 12 1762 13 2257 13 
Mobility rate 201 24 458 24 1762 10 2257 13 
Suspension rate 192 11 401 10 1246 6 1683 7 
Exclusion rate 192 0.0005 401 0.002 1246 0.006 1683 0.005 
Teaching experience* 104 53 235 51 977 55 1228 54 
Teacher salary* 109 54 242 52 1013 57 1269 56 
Teachers with 
temporary certificates 
194 4 457 5 1275 2 1764 2.5 
* percentage of teachers earning above or equal to the median state salary (or teaching experience) for 
faculty members in that type of school. 
 
In several respects, few differences seem apparent between the schools not making AYP, 
and designated as ‘failing’, and the remainder of New Jersey’s schools. For example, all 
schools report similar attendance rates, proportions of students with disabilities and 
teachers with comparable salaries and levels of experience. However, more often, the 
schools which fail to make AYP appear to be similar to the poorer Abbott schools, 
particularly on indicators that may be considered as proxies for poverty. For example, 
compared with New Jersey schools overall and the schools labelled as ‘other’, both 
Abbott schools and those that failed to make AYP have smaller proportions of students 
who speak English as their first language at home, but higher student mobility rates and 
more students with limited proficiency to speak English (LEP). Interestingly, although 
the student suspension rate appears to be higher in Abbott and ‘failing’ schools, the 
student exclusion rate is slightly higher in schools designated as ‘other’. However, the 
proportion of students who are excluded from all schools in New Jersey is relatively 
small and slight trends like those seen here ought to be treated with caution.  
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The apparent relationship between whether a school is located in a wealthy or poor 
district and its achievement on state proficiency tests is not restricted to the characteristics 
outlined above, but appears to be confirmed by the distribution of schools presented in 
table 3 below.  Three-quarters of New Jersey’s failing schools are located in the least 
wealthy, or category A districts, while only around 12% are located in the medium to 
high wealth areas (categories C or above).  
 
Table 3: Success in New Jersey’s schools, according to school district wealth category. 
 
District 
category 
Schools not 
making AYP 
Abbott schools Other schools All schools 
 N % N % N % N % 
A 149 74 360 78 31 2 398 17 
B 28 14 81 18 171 10 263 11 
CD 17 8 20 4 197 11 229 10 
DE 6 3 0 0 343 19 349 15 
FG 1 0.5 0 0 292 16 293 13 
GH 0 0 0 0 306 17 306 13 
I 0 0 0 0 405 23 405 18 
J 0 0 0 0 35 2 35 1 
Source: New Jersey Department of Education 2004a. 
 
Another concern raised by some critics of NCLB is that the strict rules for student 
subgroups would mean that students from these groups would be over-represented in 
poorer or failing schools. These concerns are considered below. However, the New Jersey 
school report card, from which much of the data used in this analysis was retrieved, 
provides little detail on the demographic make-up of New Jersey’s schools. In order to 
obtain some estimation of the proportion of students who may be from the various 
student subgroups, it is necessary to use data derived from the school’s reporting of the 
numbers of students from each subgroup who participated in state-wide tests, such as the 
Grade Eight Proficiency Assessment (GEPA). Unfortunately, this is an imperfect 
measure as it only tells us about the composition of the students in that grade, rather than 
about the school as a whole. In addition, for reasons of confidentiality, the New Jersey 
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school report card datasets suppress student numbers in cases where cell sizes are lower 
than ten. This means that for a cohort of 160 students, if fewer than ten students were 
from a Hispanic background, the numbers of Hispanic students would not be displayed. 
Where this happens, it is often possible to calculate the values for these suppressed cells 
by taking into account the numbers of students in the other student sub-groups, where this 
is not the case the numbers of students had to be estimated. Table 4 presents the 
percentage of students from the main student subgroups who participated in the GEPA 
literacy tests in 2003. 
 
Table 4: Mean percentage of students from the main subgroups participating in GEPA(L) 
 
Percentage tested 
who were…  
Schools not 
making AYP 
Abbott schools Other schools All New Jersey 
schools 
N  % N % N % N % 
African-American  192 57 330 46 1297 9 1664 17 
White 192 10 331 12 1298 72 1666 59 
Hispanic 192 29 330 37 1297 9 1664 15 
Asian 192 2 332 2 1297 7 1666 6 
General Education 193 78 333 76 1306 83 1676 82 
SEN 193 13 333 14 1306 14 1676 14 
LEP 193 7 333 8 1306 3 1676 4 
Economically 
disadvantaged 
193 74 333 75 1306 15 1676 28 
Note: the total number of schools differs from those in the tables above for two reasons, in some schools 
small cell sizes are suppressed and had to be excluded, also earlier tables include schools with younger 
students who did not sit GEPA 
 
Schools categorised here as ‘other’, that is schools which were neither designated as 
Abbott nor schools that failed to make AYP, tested lower proportions of students from 
the African-American and Hispanic communities and higher proportions of students from 
the white community. These differences can, in fact be quite staggering. For example, in 
all of New Jersey’s public schools, while around 17% of students who were assessed 
using the GEPA were from the African-American community, almost 60% of these 
students were being taught in schools that were failing to meet state standards, according 
to NCLB. On the other hand only around 10% of students being assessed in these 
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‘failing’ schools were white. Similar inequities can be found in the distribution of 
students from economically disadvantaged homes, who again were concentrated in 
schools that failed to demonstrate Adequate Yearly Progress towards full proficiency. In 
New Jersey, students who do not follow special education programmes will follow the 
‘general education’ route. The proportions of these students are lower in the Abbott 
schools and in those that failed to make AYP. 
 
Testing higher proportions of certain student sub-groups in ‘failing’ schools is only really 
an issue if these students actually achieve lower results. Using the GEPA literacy test as 
an example, table 5 shows the proportions of students from the various subgroups who 
achieved or surpassed proficiency levels in 2003. 
 
Table 5: Mean percentage of students making AYP in the GEPA literacy test 
 
Student sub-group Number of schools Students making AYP (%) 
White  514 83 
African-American 283 52 
Hispanic 325 60 
SEN 429 31 
LEP 79 16 
Economically disadvantaged 406 53 
All students  655 73 
Source: New Jersey Department of Education 2004a. 
 
Students from the African-American and Hispanic communities were less likely to reach 
minimum proficiency levels on the GEPA literacy assessment than students from white 
families. Students with LEP, SEN and from economically disadvantaged homes also had 
relatively low success rates on this test. It is also apparent from table 6, that these less 
successful students are concentrated in the least wealthy school districts. For example, in 
the 159 district A schools, less than 10% of students came from a white background. This 
contrasts with schools in more wealthy districts where the school population is 
overwhelmingly white. 
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Table 6: Distribution of selected student subgroups in different wealth districts. 
Mean percentage 
who were…  
…African-American …white …economically disadvantaged 
N % N % N % 
A 158 46 159 9 159 79 
B 84 15 84 53 85 35 
CD 63 13 63 69 65 23 
DE 90 8 90 76 90 13 
FG 76 7 76 76 76 10 
GH 72 8 72 78 73 7 
I 97 4 97 80 97 3 
J 12 1 12 87 12 1 
All 652 18 653 57 657 30 
Source: New Jersey Department of Education 2004a.   N=number of schools 
 
So on the one hand, New Jersey has established a seemingly equitable school system, 
particularly where control and change can make an impact at the institutional level, such 
as ensuring higher levels of funding for schools in less wealthy districts and similar 
distributions of experienced and salaried teachers. However, differences are revealed in 
the demographic make-up of New Jersey’s schools which appear to confirm some of the 
fears of commentators who claim that NCLB, rather than making all schools accountable 
for student progress regardless of the composition of their intake, has resulted in schools 
in poorer districts with large proportions of students from minority and disadvantaged 
communities being labelled as failures. This absence of value-added measures of school 
success which take account of the prior attainment of students as well as their background 
characteristics, is important. We know from school effectiveness research both in the 
USA and the UK that the school accounts for a relatively small proportion of the 
variation in school academic outcomes, typically 8-20% and this includes error 
components, with by far the largest variation in outcome being attributed to student 
background characteristics (Jencks 1972, Reynolds 1994, Sammons et al 1995). Relying 
solely on uncontextualised raw test scores as a means of allocating success and failure to 
schools, fails to take account of important differences between the types of students who 
attend these schools, this, in turn, may result in otherwise successful schools being 
unfairly labelled as failing. 
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The following section takes these background characteristics into account when 
developing a value-added assessment of school achievement in New Jersey which will 
allow us to look more closely at schools that fail to meet state standards and consider the 
evidence for their apparent underachievement. 
 
New Jersey’s failing schools? 
The dataset for all the schools that made Adequate Yearly Progress during the first two 
years of No Child Left Behind in New Jersey was used to create a model which, by taking 
into account both school and student characteristics, was used predict performance in 
each of the state’s proficiency assessments. This model was then used to predict the test 
outcomes for schools that did not make AYP in this period. For brevity, only the model 
relating to achievement in the Grade Eight Proficiency Assessment in literacy (GEPAL) 
is described here, although the models produced for the other state assessments revealed 
similar patterns. The most powerful model related the proportion of students who 
achieved proficiency levels or higher in the GEPA(L) to a range of variables which may 
be considered to be proxies for poverty, such as the proportion of students tested who 
come from economically disadvantaged homes, and the relative distribution of local 
sources of funding for schools. The model coefficients for the multiple linear regression 
analysis are given in table 7 below. 
 
Table 7: Coefficients for achievement in GEPA literacy assessments. 
 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant -148.37 
% economically disadvantaged tested -0.23 
Attendance rate 2.46 
Student mobility -0.24 
Disability rate -0.22 
Funding from local sources 0.08 
% white students tested 0.02 
% students with SEN tested -0.17 
Number of schools =  543 R2 =  0.72 
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Around 72% of the variance in test scores can be explained by the variables listed above. 
Using this model, it is possible to calculate the predicted scores for the 112 schools that 
failed to make AYP but tested students using the GEPA(L) and, by comparing the 
difference between their predicted and actual scores, to consider the extent to which these 
schools are underachieving. In this study, schools were designated as underachieving if 
the z-score of the difference between their predicted and actual scores was less than –1.  
 
Consider, for example school A which had failed to make Adequate Yearly Progress for 
two consecutive years and whose parents were being given the opportunity to move their 
children to other schools in that district. In this school, around 52% of students achieved 
proficiency levels or higher in the GEPA(L), while our model predicted that 40% of 
students would achieve this level. This means that, on this model, students in this school 
actually did better than expected, when the variables listed in table 7 were taken into 
account. Therefore, on this measure, there is no evidence to suggest that this school was 
underachieving. In fact, 53% of the 112 schools which, on raw score measures were 
labelled as failing under No Child Left Behind were, when background characteristics are 
taken into account, actually achieving higher sores than expected and therefore 
incorrectly labelled as failing. On the other hand, consider school B. This school is 
located in a relatively wealthy FG category district. The school was making AYP and, 
with 62% of students achieving proficiency levels or above on GEPA(L), was not subject 
to any of NCLB sanctions. However, on our value-added model, over 78% of students 
should have been working at or above proficiency levels – so on this measure, this 
seemingly successful school was actually ‘underachieving’. 
 
Discussion 
Analysis of early results from state-wide assessments that are linked to the No Child Left 
Behind accountability requirements suggest, that in New Jersey at least, some of the 
concerns voiced by critics of the legislation appear to be well founded. Although 
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equitable in its intent, the failure of the Act to provide contextualised or value added 
analysis of assessment data means that many schools appear to be unfairly labelled as 
failing. Schools that are failing to demonstrate Adequate Yearly Progress are 
overwhelmingly those that are located in the poorer school districts and who serve 
disproportionately larger numbers of students who traditionally do less well in school, 
such as students from economically disadvantaged homes and who come from the 
African-American community. On the other hand, schools located in the more wealthy 
school districts were more likely to serve larger communities of white students who were 
performing at higher levels on the state assessments. These schools were more likely to 
meet New Jersey’s accountability targets. The use of a value added model to account for 
the failure of schools to make AYP revealed that around 50% of schools were incorrectly 
labelled as failing and, it could be argued, being unfairly subjected to the punitive 
sanctions that are administered to schools that fail to make AYP for two consecutive 
years. 
 
However, it has to be remembered that these are still early days. The need to take a 
longitudinal perspective on the development of this Act is crucial. If the legislation is 
actually seen to make an impact on the achievement of the lowest achieving groups of 
students then perhaps its dissenters will be encouraged to think again. Even so, how No 
Child Left Behind will continue to work in practice does remain to be seen. Some 
commentators foresee a shift from the current relatively coercive accountability measures 
that underpin the first manifestations of the Act, to ‘softer’ measures in which the 
consequences of failing to meet annual accountability targets will be less severe (Hess 
2003, Hanushek 2003, West and Peterson 2003). Recent concessions over the assessment 
of students with SEN and LEP, the designation of highly qualified teacher certification 
and the minimum numbers of students required for test participation might suggest a 
softening of accountability measures (Popham 2004a, Department of Education 2004a). 
The use of the Act’s ‘safe-harbour’ provisions may also be developed to allow increased 
flexibility in demonstrating AYP, particularly for some student sub-groups. But at least in 
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the short-term, it is through judicial means and pressure on legislatures that many school 
districts hope to see the strict accountability rules relaxed (for example, Almond 2004). 
However, one thing that does appear to be certain, is that now that George W Bush has 
secured a second term of office, No Child Left Behind, is here to stay. 
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